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ASSESSING THE ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF MULTIPRODUCT PRICING 
 
BY DENNIS W. CARLTON,
* PATRICK GREENLEE,






 Pricing  strategies  that link purchases of different goods and offer discounts 
present a challenge to antitrust. When do such approaches, like bundling, tying, and 
bundled loyalty discounts, represent price-cutting competition, and when are they tactics 
used to exclude rival firms and reduce competition? Given that such pricing plans often 
enhance consumer surplus and total welfare, per se condemnation is unwarranted. How 
then should courts identify cases that violate the antitrust laws? 
  Interest in this issue has recently increased following the decision in LePage’s, 
Inc. et al. v. 3M Company.
1 LePage’s, a maker of invisible tape, prevailed against 3M’s 
use of multiproduct discounts that linked invisible tape purchases to other product 
categories including healthcare, home improvement, and retail auto products. The Court 
of Appeals, however, was unclear about what features of 3M’s pricing strategy 
constituted exclusionary conduct. The decision has spawned much commentary, 
including an extended discussion in the Antitrust Modernization Commission’s (AMC) 
Report and Recommendations.
2 Ongoing cases involving bundled discounts continue to 
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1 324 F.3d 141 (3
rd Cir. 2003). 
2 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Apr. 2007), available at 
http://www.amc.gov/report_recommendation/toc/htm. Carlton served as a member of the AMC. For related 
literature, see for example, G. Hewitt, Loyalty and Fidelity Discounts and Rebates: Background Note, 5 
OECD J. COMPETITION L. & POL’Y 143 (2003), Barry Nalebuff, Exclusionary Bundling, 119 ANTITRUST 
BULL. 159 (2005), Patrick Greenlee & David Reitman, Distinguishing Competitive and Exclusionary Uses  
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generate interest. In one such case, Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth,
3 the Ninth 
Circuit took the unusual step of asking for views of interested parties before issuing its 
opinion. For that case, the Ninth Circuit recently certified a question to the Oregon 
Supreme Court about whether Oregon price discrimination law follows the requirements 
delineated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp.
4 Some believe an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court is likely after this question is 
answered. 
  In their report, the AMC advocates employing a discount allocation approach to 
assess the legality of bundled loyalty discounts. The approach interprets discounts offered 
on monopoly (or tying) goods as costs of providing the competitive (or tied) good. That 
is, the approach allocates the discounts provided on one product (or category of products) 
to the competitive product, and then asks whether the firm sold the latter good below 
cost.
5 In essence, this applies the logic of predatory pricing to multiproduct discounts. To 
illustrate with an example, suppose a firm has a monopoly in product A and faces 
competition in product B. Its constant marginal cost for B is $5, and consumers purchase 
up to one unit of each good. The monopolist offers the following loyalty discount: to 
customers that purchase my B product at a price equal to $6, the price for A is only $10, 
otherwise the price for A is $12. The $2 discount offered on the monopoly product ($12 - 
$10) is allocated as a cost for B, so the cost to offering B is $7 ($5 production cost plus $2 
allocated discount). Since this $7 cost for B exceeds the price of B ($6), the monopolist 
                                                                                                                                                 
of Loyalty Discounts 119 ANTITRUST BULL. 441 (2005), Roy T. Englert Jr., Defending the Result in 
LePage’s v. 3M: A Response to Other Commentators, 119 ANTITRUST BULL. 481 (2005), David Spector, 
Loyalty Rebates: An Assessment of Competitive Concerns and a Proposed Structured Rule of Reason, 1 
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 89 (2005), Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Economics of Loyalty Discounts and 
Antitrust Law in the United States, 1 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 115 (2005), Alberto Heimler, Below Cost 
Pricing and Loyalty-inducing Discounts: Are they Restrictive and, if so, When? 1 COMPETITION POL’Y 
INT’L 149 (2005), and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 3M’s Bundling Rebates: An Economic Perspective, 72 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 243 (2005). 
3 05-35627 D.C. No. CV-02-06032-ALH (9
th Cir. 2007). 
4 509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
5 This approach was previously advocated by the plaintiff in Ortho Diagnostics Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Lab, 
Inc. 920 F. Supp. 455 (1996), and has come to be known by many as the “Ortho test”. There is some 
imprecision across commentaries about what the test is, including which firm’s costs are used for the test.  
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flunks the discount allocation test. The argument is then that, because the firm flunks the 
discount allocation test, it must earn less by selling B, i.e., it could increase profits by 
selling just A for $12. But as we will show this is in fact not always the case.  
  While there is firm economic logic in single product predatory pricing cases 
behind the dual requirements of showing that the defendant priced below (some measure 
of) marginal cost and that it can recoup its losses, that same logic does not apply when 
price schedules link multiple products. A single product firm that prices every unit below 
marginal cost must have some motive other than short run profit maximization. 
Multiproduct firms, in contrast, may have several non-exclusionary motives such as price 
discrimination for adopting pricing plans in which some measure of price (after discounts 
have been allocated) is below some measure of cost. Firms that use such pricing plans for 
non-exclusionary rationales can fail an incremental cost test like that advocated by the 
AMC. Therefore, because the analogy to single product predation does not apply in more 
complex settings involving multiple goods or non-linear pricing, we reject the logic 
underlying the AMC type tests and instead focus on a test specifically framed to address 
the economics underlying exclusionary conduct. 
  A common ingredient in various economic theories that generate harmful 
exclusion is the presence of scale economies. While the economies do not have to apply 
specifically to production (meaning that they can relate, for example, to network 
externalities), harm arises in these theories typically when the dominant firm can deny 
scale to rivals and thereby diminish their ability to compete. Our approach to analyzing 
the anticompetitive effects of bundling focuses on establishing the existence of 
significant scale economies and the likely competitive effects that result from denying 
scale. Our approach allows us to generate a safe harbor that is relatively easy to 
implement. We also allow an efficiencies defense similar to that used in mergers. 
Although our analysis reveals the drawbacks of a price cost test in a multi-product 
setting, we recognize the value of having clear safe harbors. Accordingly, we think it 
reasonable to have some price cost test such as the AMC test as a safe harbor though the 
imperfections of such a test must be recognized. Given our view that bundled discounts 
are generally procompetitive, we would tolerate the inability of a price cost test to detect 
all instances of anticompetitive exclusionary conduct. But the failure to fall into a price  
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cost safe harbor should not lead to condemnation and legal liability since our analysis 
shows that non-exclusionary behavior can easily fail such tests. Using the economic 
theory that underlies most models of anticompetitive exclusion, we develop a series of 
tests for alternative safe harbors. For those who do not share our views on the desirability 
of price cost safe harbors in this setting, they should use our tests in place of, rather than 
in conjunction with, price cost tests. 
  This paper is organized in the following manner. Section II discusses various 
rationales for non-linear pricing strategies. It uses the single product case to establish a 
foundation, and then explores pricing strategies for firms that sell multiple products. 
Exclusionary and non-exclusionary rationales are discussed, as are the market conditions 
required for the various explanations to be plausible. Section III focuses on the approach 
recommended by the AMC to analyze bundled loyalty discounts, and discusses a number 
of its shortcomings. Section IV presents our analytic approach to multiproduct non-linear 
pricing focusing on scale effects. We conclude in Section V with an application of our 
approach to LePage’s and PeaceHealth. 
 
II. PRICING RATIONALES 
  In this section, we discuss competitive and potentially anticompetitive rationales 
for various pricing schemes. We start with the single product case, and then move to 
multiproduct pricing. 
A.  Single product pricing 
  Let us focus initially on the simplest type of single product pricing, namely 
uniform pricing. By uniform pricing we mean that the seller charges the same price for 
every unit sold, so that the total outlay function for any customer that purchases q units is 
simply a line through the origin with slope equal to the price per unit p:  q p q E = ) ( . 
When might the level of a uniform price be used as a strategy to harm rivals and 
thereby reduce competition? An observed high unit price should not be condemned as 
anti-competitive, because high prices make it easier for rival firms to survive.
6 Prices 
                                                 
6 High prices are consistent with an absence of robust competition. If competition has been reduced in some 
manner, however, observed high prices are a symptom rather than a cause. A price in excess of a firm’s 
marginal cost but below rivals’ marginal cost can be exclusionary. However, we believe it is prudent to  
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below marginal cost, however, generate losses to the firm, at least in the short term. For 
such cases, it is natural to ask why the firm chooses to incur such losses. One possible 
anticompetitive motive is predatory pricing whereby the firm incurs short term losses in 
order to induce exit by rival firms, and then charge higher prices after competition has 
been eliminated. For such a strategy to be profitable, the predator firm correctly 
anticipates recouping its short term losses via higher prices in later periods. This 
generates the familiar legal requirements for pursuing a predatory pricing claim—
namely, price below some measure of marginal cost and an ability to recoup short term 
losses via subsequent higher prices. 
Some caution, however, is warranted in using this price/cost comparison as a test 
for anticompetitive behavior. Dynamic considerations, like learning by doing or 
consumer switching costs, may make it optimal for what looks like below cost pricing, 
even when a firm has no intent or ability to exclude. If production costs decline 
substantially with production experience, a firm may find it optimal to move quickly 
down its learning curve in order to exploit cost advantages sooner. Accomplishing this 
may require the firm to sell at prices below (its initially high) cost. Similarly, if 
consumers have high switching costs for a good, firms may find it optimal to sell initial 
units to new customers at a low price (perhaps equal to zero), and then sell later units at a 
much higher price. In these cases, pricing below some measure of cost can be viewed as 
making an investment today (in technology or consumer relationships) that generates 
returns tomorrow (due to cost advantages or consumer switching costs). It would be a 
mistake to condemn such strategies as anticompetitive.
7 
Let us turn now to non-linear pricing of a single product. A non-linear price 
schedule is any outlay function other than E(q) = p q. Perhaps the most common type of 
                                                                                                                                                 
presume any price that exceeds marginal cost is legal. To do otherwise runs the risk of dampening firms’ 
incentives to set low prices or to innovate. See Brooke Group. 
7 Indeed, a correct calculation of marginal cost should include these dynamic considerations. See Andrew 
Dick, Learning by Doing and Dumping in the Semiconductor Industry, 34 J.L. & ECON. 133 (1991), for an 
analysis of how learning by doing can lead to what looks like below marginal cost pricing in the absence of 
a predatory rationale. Paul Klemperer, Markets with Consumer Switching Costs, 102 Q.J. ECON. 375 (1987) 
shows a similar result for switching costs.  
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non-linear price schedule is a quantity discount where the schedule offers lower unit 
prices for higher volume tiers.
8 
We can look for potentially troublesome pricing by comparing marginal revenue 
to marginal cost. We will soon see why a deviation from such pricing may be peculiar. 
As in the case of uniform pricing, if marginal revenue is well-defined throughout the 
price schedule and weakly exceeds marginal cost, then the pricing strategy should be 
presumed legal.
9 What if marginal cost exceeds marginal revenue over some portion of 
the pricing schedule? This can be potentially problematic only if a large segment of 
consumers (measured in terms of total purchased volume) choose to purchase quantities 
that fall in these “potentially predatory” regions.
10 Obviously, if all consumers purchase 
                                                 
8 An all units discount is a pricing scheme that has the property that the price declines for every unit when a 
buyer reaches order size thresholds. For example, a customer may be charged $10 per compact disc for 
orders that include less than 10 items, $7 per compact disc for orders between 10 and 30 items, and $4 per 
compact disc on orders that include more than 30 items. Since an order with 9 items costs $90 and an order 
with 10 items costs only $70, the incremental price for the 10th item is -$20. Given an order with 7 items, 
the seller offers a package of three additional items at zero additional cost. 
9 If the cost to supply a customer depends only on that customer’s consumption, then an alternative 
approach would be to say that a price schedule is never predatory as long as, for all q, E(q) weakly exceeds 
the total variable cost of supplying q units. This is a less stringent test than the one in the text, and likely is 
easier to apply. 
10 For both smooth and discontinuous price schedules, “potentially predatory” regions consist of quantity 
ranges for which incremental cost exceeds incremental revenue. For an all-units discount, this typically 
occurs for a number of increments that include a discontinuity (at which price declines for every unit 
purchased). For the example presented supra note 8, there are several potentially predatory regions around 
each discontinuity in the price schedule. If the marginal cost for a CD is $4, these include [7, 10], [10, 17], 
and [2, 32]. For the first of these examples, 6 units sell for $60 and 10 units sell for $70, so the incremental 
4 units sell for an incremental $10 which is below incremental cost (4 x $4 = $16). For the last of these 
examples, 1 unit sells for $10, 32 units sell for $128, so the incremental 31 units cost an incremental $118 
which is less than cost (31 x $4 = $124). Which increment is relevant? This example was inspired by an 
actual clearance sale where most customers were likely to have a base quantity of zero absent the sale. Thus 
the relevant base quantity to consider is zero units. Provided marginal cost does not exceed $4 for this 
example, there are no potentially predatory increments of the form [0, q], and thus none of these calculated 
potentially predatory increments is relevant. Alternatively, if the pricing scheme applies not to an 
individual but to a retailer and involves a product for which most retailers carry at least nine units of  
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volumes that fall below the potentially problematic region, then the “potentially 
predatory” region has no effect. Alternatively, if all consumers purchase volumes that 
sufficiently exceed a “potentially predatory” region, then consumers make their 
purchasing decision based on an incremental price that exceeds incremental cost.
11 Thus, 
the “potentially predatory” region again has no effect on competition. The only remaining 
case is if a large segment of consumers chooses to purchase quantities that fall in such a 
region. For this case, the inquiry then turns to assessing the effect that making these sales 
below incremental cost has on rivals. The total volume that shifts from a rival due to such 
a strategy will depend on how many consumers fall in this region of the price schedule, 
as well as how many additional units they purchase because price (marginal revenue) is 
below marginal cost. This incremental volume will depend on what the price for these 
units would have been but for the “potentially predatory” pricing schedule. While this 
will in general be hard to determine, we advocate assuming that the firm would price 
units at marginal cost.
12 Only if the total shifted volume denies scale which induces exit 
or raises rivals’ marginal costs should the pricing strategy be considered anticompetitive. 
  Firms may employ non-linear price schedules for reasons other than 
anticompetitive exclusion. First, economies of scale may make it less costly per unit for a 
firm to manufacture or deliver large quantities. In such cases, declining marginal revenue 
may arise because the relevant incremental cost is declining. For example, customers that 
purchase a full truckload of goods may enjoy a lower per unit price than a customer that 
purchases only half a truckload. 
                                                                                                                                                 
inventory, but could purchase as many as 15 to 17 units of this brand, then the increments starting at 10 
may be relevant. Some of these are potentially predatory, so the inquiry would continue. 
11 In such cases, for a consumer contemplating whether to alter its purchase by one unit, the price for the 
marginal unit exceeds marginal cost. Alternatively, if the consumer decides between a purchase of q units 
or no purchase at all, the price for the incremental q units exceeds incremental costs if q lies sufficiently 
outside a “potentially predatory” region. In both cases, the relevant “price” exceeds the relevant cost. 
12 If the firm could not employ a price schedule with “potentially predatory” regions, it does not follow that 
competition would necessarily drive price down to marginal cost, especially if products are differentiated. 
Using marginal cost pricing as the benchmark makes it more difficult for a plaintiff to establish that a 
nonlinear pricing plan is exclusionary, but this benchmark also reduces the likelihood of making errors in 
which an uncompetitive firm prevails in court when it could not prevail in the marketplace.  
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Second, when a single product monopolist is not perfectly informed about 
consumer preferences, it may employ a non-linear price schedule in order to sort potential 
customers by willingness to pay and thereby second degree price discriminate. A firm 
practices second degree price discrimination when it offers a price schedule that sorts 
consumer types based on their selections from the schedule. The firm designs the price 
schedule to simultaneously accomplish two goals: (1) offer each consumer type (or 
segment of consumers) a deal that they prefer over all others, and (2) extract as much 
value as possible from all consumers collectively. The monopolist’s objective can be 
viewed as selecting the schedule (a collection of quantity-payment offers) that maximizes 
profit, subject to the constraints that each consumer type purchases the offer designed for 
it—namely, the consumer type prefers it over all other offers, and prefers it over the 
option of not making any purchase.
13 
Would a price discriminating monopolist ever employ a price schedule that has the 
property that over some range of output marginal cost exceeds marginal revenue? In 
general, the answer to this question is “no.” When consumer preferences satisfy two 
technical properties, it has been established that marginal revenue in the monopolist’s 
optimal price schedule strictly exceeds marginal cost for all quantity levels except the 
largest quantity sold. At the largest quantity sold, price equals marginal cost.
14 That is, 
                                                 
13 A standard assumption in models of this sort is that resale is not possible. Allowing the possibility of 
resale limits the ability of firms to price discriminate in these settings. 
14 The first technical property is that preferences satisfy what is called a “single crossing property”: for any 
given pair of consumer types, one type always values an additional unit of the good more than the other 
type, regardless of the current quantity. The second technical property is that the distribution of types has 
an increasing hazard rate, i.e. if consumer type v (where v is the valuation) has density  ) (v f  and 
distribution  ) (v F , then  )] ( 1 /[ ) ( v F v f −  is an increasing function of v. This latter condition is satisfied 
by many distributions including uniform, normal, and logistic. For greater detail, consult JEAN TIROLE, THE 
THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 142 (1988) or Eric Maskin & John Riley, Monopoly with 
Incomplete Information, 15 RAND J. ECON. 171 (1984). If the firm employs a discontinuous price schedule 
so that marginal revenue is not everywhere well-defined, this condition holds wherever marginal revenue is 
well-defined. 
  The observation that marginal revenue should exceed marginal cost when a firm practices 
nonlinear pricing depends importantly on the information that the firm has about customers. In the example  
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price is never below marginal cost in an optimal price schedule. If the price schedule is 
discontinuous, there may be increments for which incremental cost exceeds incremental 
revenue for volume levels near the discontinuity, but the slope of the outlay function 
(where the slope is well-defined) will exceed marginal cost. Thinking of marginal 
revenue as the price per unit for the next incremental unit, this says that in the continuous 
case a single product monopolist engaged in second degree price discrimination would 
have no regions in its price schedule where marginal cost exceeds marginal revenue. 
B.  Multiproduct pricing 
  Thus far, we have focused on pricing for a single good. In our discussion, a 
consumer’s expenditure for that single good depended only on the quantity of that good 
purchased by the consumer. This condition can be relaxed in at least two ways: (1) when 
a firm sells multiple products, the outlay function need not be additively separable across 
goods, so that the charge for a given quantity of a firm’s first good can depend on how 
many units of the firm’s other goods are purchased at the same time,
15 and (2) the price 
charged for a given quantity of a firm’s good may depend on how many units of a rival 
firm’s competing good are purchased in a given time period. 
                                                                                                                                                 
just discussed, the firm is assumed to know the distribution of consumer preferences but cannot distinguish 
amongst consumers, and so offers everyone the same nonlinear pricing schedule. With other assumptions 
about information, it might be possible to offer different price schedules to different consumers. In such 
cases it might be more complicated to determine whether the observed pricing is so inconsistent with profit 
maximization as to merit further inquiry. For example, suppose that there is a constant marginal cost of $7, 
that consumer 1 has a willingness to pay of $10 for one unit and zero thereafter, while consumer 2 has a 
willingness to pay of $8 for the first unit, $8 for the second unit and zero thereafter. A monopolist that can 
identify consumers and prevent resale will charge customer 1 $10 for one unit, and customer 2 $8 per unit 
for each of two units. The analyst will observe that one unit sells for $10 while two units sell for $16. It 
would be improper to calculate the incremental price of the second unit as $6 ($16-$10) and conclude that 
something is unusual because $6 is below the cost of $7. 
15 The outlay function is additively separable if and only if the total outlay function can be expressed as a 
sum of single product outlay functions:  ∑ = ) ( ) , , ( 1 j j n q E q q E K  for all purchase orders  ) , , ( 1 n q q K . 
If such a decomposition is not possible, then the pricing of at least one product is linked in some manner to 
the purchased quantities of other products.   
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Bundles are examples of (1). The price of a beverage, for example, may depend 
on whether the consumer also purchases a main course and side dish to accompany the 
beverage. 
Loyalty discounts and ties are examples of (2). Loyalty discounts provide benefits 
to customers that are sufficiently loyal to the supplier, where “loyalty” typically is 
measured as the fraction of all purchases in a product category that are made from the 
supplier. For example, in Concord Boat v. Brunswick Corp., boat builder Concord 
enjoyed a 3% price reduction on every engine purchased from Brunswick provided 
Concord sourced at least 80% of its engine requirements from Brunswick.
16 In such 
cases, the charge for eight Brunswick engines will depend on whether the boat builder 
purchased more than two engines from a rival supplier. Such loyalty requirements may 
also link across different products. These are often referred to as “bundled loyalty 
discounts.” For example, the price an office supply store pays for 3M’s Post-it notes may 
depend on the quantity of invisible tape purchased from 3M. In a tying strategy, a firm 
offers the tying good only to consumers that are 100% loyal in their purchases of the tied 
good.
17 In such cases, one can interpret the “list” price for the tying good by itself as 
being so high that there is zero demand. Seen in this light, ties are a special case of 
bundled loyalty discounts, so a firm may use a loyalty discount as a de facto tying 
strategy. Because the economics of bundled pricing and tie-in sales are so closely related, 
their separate treatment under antitrust law is anomalous. 
Before addressing tests for anticompetitive uses of non-linear pricing, which we 
consider in detail in the next two sections, we briefly discuss non-exclusionary and 
exclusionary motives for bundling and tying.
18 Among the non-exclusionary motives for 
tying/bundling are (1) achieving efficiencies in production or selling, or improved 
                                                 
16 207 F.3d 1039 (8
th Cir. 2000). 
17 There are several definitions of tying. In some, the quantity of the tying good is variable while in other 
cases it need not be. The key point is that the same economic forces operate when a group of products are 
purchased and the price for that group of products depends on the underlying quantities of each purchased 
product, and perhaps on the quantities purchased from rival firms. 
18 For greater detail, consult Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, Tying, in ISSUES IN COMPETITION 
LAW AND POLICY (American Bar Association, forthcoming, 2007) and BARRY NALEBUFF, BUNDLING, 
TYING, AND PORTFOLIO EFFECTS (DTI Econ. Paper No. 1, 2003).  
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product mix, (2) price discrimination, and (3) increasing product differentiation. 
Anticompetitive motives include (4) extending a monopoly from one product to another, 
and (5) enhancing existing market power or preserving a monopoly from potential entry. 
1. Achieving efficiencies 
When there are economies of scope or scale in the manufacture, selling, or delivery of 
products, bundling them together can allow the supplier to achieve efficiencies that lower 
its costs and prices paid by consumers. David S. Evans and Michael Salinger illustrate 
this effect via cold medicines that include multiple active ingredients, RadioShack 
packages that include electrical adapters for several countries, and the clustering of 
optional equipment for automobiles into a small number of packages.
19 In these 
examples, the authors argue, the bundling reduces production costs, saves valuable retail 
shelf space, or reduces costs by simplifying production logistics.  
Tying can preserve or improve quality by overcoming informational failures. 
When one product’s performance relies on the quality of other products (either 
complements or inputs) but consumers cannot determine which component caused a 
performance failure, requiring the consumer to use only a single firm’s components 
solves the blame game and preserves firm reputation. The single firm will have better 
incentives to provide high quality components than a firm that can blame, or partially 
blame, someone else.
20 Roy W. Kenney and Benjamin Klein make a related argument in 
which bundling is used when it is difficult for consumers to ascertain quality, and pricing 
based on average quality is used to reduce transaction costs.
21 
Finally, tying can improve efficiency in variable proportions settings by 
eliminating distortions created by the presence of market power. For example, if a 
durable good provider is a monopolist but maintenance is competitively supplied, 
                                                 
19 David S. Evans & Michael Salinger, Why Do Firms Bundle and Tie? Evidence from Competitive Markets 
and Implications for Tying Law, 22 YALE J. REG. 37 (2005) and David S. Evans & Michael Salinger, The 
Role of Cost in Determining when Firms Offer Bundles, 56 J. INDUS. ECON. 143 (2008). 
20 James D. Dana, Jr. & Kathryn E. Spier, Bundling and Product Reputation (unpublished manuscript, 
available at http://www.economics.neu.edu/dana/papers/DanaSpierBundling.pdf, 2007) formally show how 
bundling can make it easier for a firm to offer high quality when consumers cannot tell which component 
failed. That is, bundling allows the firm to internalize a “reputation externality.” 
21 Roy W. Kenney & Benjamin Klein, The Economics of Block Booking, 26 J.L. & ECON. 497 (1983).  
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consumers will tend to consume too much maintenance because they will face a greater 
markup on equipment compared to service. Tying maintenance to the sale of durable 
units avoids the distortion.
22 
Absent the presence of other anticompetitive effects, bundles and ties that 
increase efficiency by reducing costs, increasing quality, or reducing product mix 
distortions should be encouraged. 
2. Price discrimination 
A firm can use bundling/tying to price discriminate among its customers. This can 
happen in at least three ways. First, if a firm sells a durable good that requires a 
consumable (like photocopiers and toner), and consumers that place a high value on the 
services provided by a durable good also consume large amounts of the consumable, then 
a firm that ties the durable good to purchases of the consumable can charge different 
effective “system” prices to different types of consumers. This pricing strategy is referred 
to as metering. Compared to uniform monopoly pricing, the tie allows the firm to mark 
up its price of the consumable above the competitive level and lower the price for the 
durable good.
23  
Second, if consumer valuations for two products generally are negatively 
correlated, so that individuals that really like a first product tend to dislike a second 
product, then valuations for the bundle (assuming there are no interaction effects when 
the two goods are consumed together) exhibit lower variance than the sum of the 
variances of the valuation of each product separately. In such cases, the optimal bundle 
price extracts a larger fraction of consumer surplus than does setting separate prices for 
each of the two goods. Intuitively, consumers that really like the first product assign a 
                                                 
22 See TIROLE, supra note 14, at 181 for a formal demonstration. DENNIS W. CARLTON & MICHAEL 
WALDMAN, COMPETITION, MONOPOLY, AND AFTERMARKETS (NBER Working Paper No. 8086 revised, 
2007) show how a similar result arises in competitive durable goods markets with switching costs. 
23 Note that this approach does not necessarily require the two goods to be complements. Provided that 
consumers with valuations for one good typically purchase large amounts of a second (perhaps unrelated) 
good, tying in order to meter can allow the firm to extract more rents than uniform pricing. See Zhiqi Chen 
&Thomas Ross, Refusals to Deal, Price Discrimination, and Independent Service Organizations, 2 J. 
ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 593 (1993) and Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Antitrust Economic Analysis 
After Kodak, 3 S. CT. ECON. REV. 43 (1993).  
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large portion of the bundle price to the first good, while those that greatly prefer the 
second good view the bundle price as mostly applying to the second good. Seen in this 
light, the bundling firm effectively charges different prices for each good to different 
customers, i.e. it price discriminates. George J. Stigler suggests this motive for film 
owners that offer block booking to film exhibitors.
24 
Third, a firm can sort customers by offering various bundles at different prices, so 
that the firm captures more value (via higher prices) from consumers with high 
valuations. For example, many airlines bundle departing and return flights together and 
set different prices for various flight pairs in order to sort business travelers (who may 
have high willingness to pay) from vacationers (who may generally have greater 
flexibility and/or less willingness to pay). Itineraries with Saturday night stays, which 
often are sold to vacationers rather than business travelers, frequently are priced lower. 
To price discriminate in this fashion requires the seller to bundle the flights together 
because a seat on a Wednesday evening return flight might be occupied by a business 
traveler making a day trip, or by a vacationer completing a two week holiday. 
  Price discrimination is not by itself an antitrust violation because it need not have 
any anticompetitive effect on rivals (indeed there may not be any rivals). Therefore it 
should not be the basis for challenging a pricing strategy.
25 
3. Increasing product differentiation 
Tying can increase product differentiation which can soften price competition. 
For example, a firm that ties a homogenous product (B) to a monopoly product (A) has 
differentiated its B product. If the firm can commit to the tie, it commits not to compete 
aggressively for consumers that do not like the A product. Rather than heated competition 
                                                 
24 GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 165 (1983). For additional discussion of a 
monopolist’s use of bundles to price discriminate, consult R. Preston McAfee, John McMillan & Michael 
D. Whinston, Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of Values, 104 Q.J. ECON. 
371 (1989), W.J. Adams & J.L. Yellen, Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly, 90 Q.J. ECON. 
475 (1976), and Richard Schmalensee, Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third-Degree 
Price Discrimination, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 242 (1981). 
25 For further discussion, consult DENNIS W. CARLTON & KEN HEYER, APPROPRIATE ANTITRUST POLICY 




between two firms offering homogenous products, tying introduces product (or bundle) 
differentiation and both firms may respond by raising price.
26 This use of tying/bundling 
is a type of product positioning, akin to a cereal maker deciding how much sugar to 
include in each of its varieties. While it may result in higher prices, this use should not be 
the basis for a challenge when firms unilaterally adopt such a strategy for the usual 
reasons associated with concerns about unilateral decision making. If done collusively, 
such a tying strategy may be part of a market allocation scheme. 
  We now turn to anticompetitive uses of bundling/tying strategies. 
4. Monopolizing a second market 
The most frequently pursued anticompetitive claim for bundling/tying is that 
linking sales of two products allows a firm with significant market power in one product 
to extend or “leverage” its market power into other (currently) competitive markets. Such 
theories must overcome the “one monopoly rent” critique put forward by economists and 
attorneys affiliated with the University of Chicago.
27 While tying to exclude in a second 
competitive market may be feasible for a monopolist, the one monopoly rent critique 
demonstrates that such tying often is not profitable, and therefore anticompetitive 
exclusion is unlikely to be the motive behind tying. A collection of subsequent papers has 
established the generality of the one monopoly rent critique, and has also established 
settings in which the critique does not apply, so that tying to exclude is feasible and 
profitable.
28 
  A key ingredient in most of the models that generate harmful tying in equilibrium 
is the presence of a scale economy. With these, tying allows the monopolist to profitably 
exclude a rival, or to profit from market segments it cannot reach with just its monopoly 
                                                 
26 For economic analyses, consult Yongmin Chen, Equilibrium Product Bundling, 70 J. BUS. 85 (1997) and 
Jose Carbajo, David de Meza & Daniel J. Seidmann, A Strategic Motivation for Commodity Bundling, 38 J. 
INDUS. ECON. 283 (1990). 
27 See, for example, Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 NW. 
UNIV. L. REV. 281 (1956), Ward S. Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 Yale L.J. 
19 (1957), RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976), and ROBERT H. 
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978). 
28 See Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 837 (1990), and the 
literature reviews by Carlton & Waldman, supra note 18, and NALEBUFF, supra note 18.  
 
16
good. For example, Michael D. Whinston shows harmful tying in a complementary good 
setting when there are scale economies for the rival firm’s production of the 
complementary good, and there are uses of the complementary good that do not require 
the monopoly good. In this setting, tying the competitive good to the monopoly good can 
deny necessary scale to the rival firm, leading the rival firm to exit, and allowing the 
monopolist to set higher prices for the complementary good.
29 The monopolist profits 
from this tying because following exit it can earn greater profit from consumers that had 
no interest in its monopoly product. 
  Whinston and Barry Nalebuff each show similar results concerning independent 
products.
30 In each case there are two independent products, a firm that is a monopolist in 
one market and which also sells the second product, and a potential rival that can enter 
the second market. In Whinston’s version of this argument tying causes the incumbent to 
be a more aggressive competitor in setting the bundle price than when he sells individual 
products. The reason is that failure to sell the bundle deprives the monopolist of the profit 
on both products, so the monopolist has a greater incentive to sell when he bundles. This 
behavior lowers rival profits. The end result is that tying can reduce the rival’s profit 
sufficiently that it decides not to enter because it is now unable to cover its fixed costs, 
and when this is the case tying can be optimal for the monopolist.
31 
  The economy of scale can also take the form of an R&D investment in a dynamic 
setting. For example, the rival firm can have constant returns to scale in a period but 
                                                 
29 There need to be uses for the competitive good that do not depend on the monopoly good. Otherwise the 
value from the competitive good relies on the presence of the monopoly good, and the monopolist does just 
as well or better by not tying and setting the two prices appropriately. That is, if there are no separate uses 
for the competitive good in this setting, then the one monopoly rent critique is valid. For additional detail, 
see Whinston supra note 28, and Carlton & Waldman supra note 18. 
30 See Whinston, supra note 28, and Barry Nalebuff, Bundling as an Entry Barrier, 119 Q.J. ECON. 159 
(2004).  
31 Although there are important differences between Whinston’s and Nalebuff’s analyses such as that in 
Whinston’s analysis the monopolist can commit to whether or not it ties while Nalebuff assumes no 
commitment, from our perspective the basic argument is the same. Tying can stop entry by making it 
infeasible for the rival to cover its fixed costs, and this increases monopoly profits because the firm 
becomes a monopolist in a second market.  
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R&D investments today can serve to lower marginal costs tomorrow. If tying by the 
monopolist serves to lower the rival’s output, then the anticipation of such tying 
tomorrow can lower the rival’s R&D expenditure today and in this way increase the 
rival’s marginal cost in subsequent periods. Similar to what was true in Whinston’s 
complementary good analysis, this can increase monopoly profits in future sales to 
customers with no interest in the monopolized product. 
5. Enhancing existing market power or maintaining a monopoly 
When the two products are complements and rival firms have economies of scale, 
the dominant firm may tie in order to eliminate an inferior competing version of its 
primary good, or to deter subsequent entry by a complementary good provider into the 
primary good. A provider of an inferior version of the primary good may make no sales, 
but if not excluded can still have a competitive effect by constraining the price charged 
for the primary good. If there are scale economies in producing the complementary good 
such that tying induces all rival complementary good producers to exit, then tying 
induces exit by the rival primary good provider (because it does not have an independent 
source for the complementary good). This in turn allows the dominant firm to set higher 
prices for its primary good. This tying strategy is a way to increase the rival’s costs of 
providing an alternative to consumers (by eliminating its sources for complementary 
goods).
32 
  Dennis W. Carlton and Michael Waldman consider a dynamic setting in which an 
incumbent firm sells a primary good and a complementary good.
33 In the first period, a 
potential entrant decides whether to enter and produce a superior complementary good. In 
the second period, the potential entrant decides whether to enter and produce the superior 
complementary good (if it has not already done so), and whether to enter and produce an 
identical primary good. When there are entry costs for each market, tying by the 
incumbent may deter entry (in the complementary good) in the first period by denying 
scale. If entry costs for the complementary good can only be covered by selling in both 
periods, tying in the first period may induce the potential entrant not to sell the 
                                                 
32 For more detail and discussion, consult Whinston supra note 28, and Carlton & Waldman supra note 22. 
33 Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market 
Power in Evolving Industries, 33 RAND J. ECON. 194 (2002).  
 
18
complementary good in either period. And given that it makes no complementary good 
sales, tying may cause entry into the primary good market to become unprofitable. 
  Summarizing our discussion of rationale (5), key ingredients to these theories of 
harm are (i) the products that are tied/bundled are complements, (ii) there are uses for the 
complementary goods other than with the dominant firm’s primary good,
34 and (iii) there 
are scale economies in producing the goods. If the linked products are not complements, 
then linking them cannot affect the profitability of participating in the primary good 
market. If there are no other uses for the complementary goods, then the one monopoly 
rent critique typically applies. And if there are no scale economies, then denying sales to 
a potential entrant does not diminish the competitive discipline offered by a potential 
entrant. 
  Taking rationales (4) and (5) together, these anticompetitive motives for bundling 
(monopolizing a second market, maintaining an existing one) share a common ingredient: 
the presence of significant scale economies. Under these theories of harm, the firm that 
links products via its pricing strategy denies scale sufficient to completely exclude its 
(potential or actual) rivals. Or said differently, the total sales opportunities that remain 
available to the rival firm(s) after the bundling strategy is employed will not cover the 
rival firm’s fixed costs, so the rival exits or decides not to enter. If a non-linear pricing 
strategy denies sales to a rival, but the rival remains in business, the pricing strategy can 
damage competition only if the lost sales cause the rival firm’s marginal cost to increase. 
Where scale economies exist, reducing scale raises average cost, but does not necessarily 
increase marginal cost. The approach we propose in Section IV emphasizes the role of 
                                                 
34 In Carlton & Waldman supra note 33, for example, the alternative use of the rival’s complementary good 
is pairing it with the rival’s primary good. Note that one exception is DENNIS W. CARLTON & MICHAEL 
WALDMAN, TYING, UPGRADES, AND SWITCHING COSTS IN DURABLE GOODS MARKETS (NBER Working 
Paper No. 11407 revised, 2006) where, even though exclusionary tying can be profitable, complementary 
goods can be used only with the dominant firm’s primary good. In that explicitly dynamic model tying is 
not used to cause a rival to exit or increase its marginal cost, but rather to capture upgrade and switching 
cost profits that, due to the dynamic nature of the model, cannot be captured through optimal pricing of the 
monopolized product. For a related analysis, see Janusz Ordover & Greg Shaffer, Exclusionary Discounts 
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.simon.rochester.edu/fac/shaffer/Published/two-units-
fullproof.pdf, 2007).  
 
19
scale economies. Before turning to that, we first use our analysis to discuss the price/cost 
test approach introduced in Ortho, advocated by the AMC, and recently employed in 
PeaceHealth. 
 
III. BUNDLED LOYALTY DISCOUNTS AND THE AMC RECOMMENDATION 
  In its Report and Recommendations, the AMC advocates the following three-
prong approach to determine whether bundled loyalty discounts that link pricing for a 
monopoly product to purchases of a competitive product violate Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act: 
(1) If the loyalty program generates a total discount of D for the monopoly product, 
allocate this discount to the competitive product and check whether the defendant 
firm sold the competitive product below its incremental cost (where the 
competitive good’s price has been reduced, or its cost has been increased, to 
reflect the discount D). If the firm did not sell the competitive product below its 
incremental cost (calculated in this fashion), then there is not a violation. 
(2) If the discounted-adjusted price is below cost, check whether the defendant is 
likely to recoup these short-term losses. If recoupment is unlikely, then again 
there is no violation. 
(3) Finally, if price is below cost and recoupment is likely, check whether the loyalty 
program is likely to have “an adverse effect on competition.” 
This approach treats the offered discount as an opportunity cost, i.e. it implicitly assumes 
that the firm could have sold the monopoly good at the undiscounted price, but instead 
chose to offer the discount D. In other words, it implicitly assumes that the price for the 
monopoly good when sold separately is unaffected by the tie and that the number of units 
sold of the monopolized good is not significantly reduced when goods are sold 
separately. If the revenues collected for the competitive product do not exceed the costs 
of the competitive product plus the opportunity cost D, then why has the firm offered 
such a program? Calculated in this manner, the firm makes incremental losses and would  
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have earned more if it had sold only the monopoly product at the undiscounted price. 
That is, the loyalty program is noncompensatory.
35 
  This price/cost test is a predatory pricing test. The main difference between this 
and the standard predatory pricing test is that instead of comparing a uniform price for a 
single good to some measure of its marginal cost, the test now focuses on one of multiple 
goods sold by the defendant firm, and allocates a discount earned on other product(s) to 
this one. While the logic behind such a test is straightforward for the single product case, 
a number of logical problems arise for the multiproduct case.
36 The problem is that the 
logic underlying the AMC test ignores the incentive of a firm to use tie-ins or bundling as 
a method to price discriminate. Accordingly, the AMC test fails to be a sensible test when 
tie-ins and bundling are used to price discriminate. 
  First, a firm may set portions of a multiproduct non-linear pricing schedule with 
no intention of selling any units at such prices. Such prices may be set in a manner that 
allows the firm to price discriminate. For example, a firm could set a very high list price 
for one of its goods, and provide a substantial discount on this good only to consumers 
that purchased 100% of their requirements of a second good from that firm. If the firm 
would make no sales of the first good at the high list price, then this pricing strategy is de 
facto tying rather than predatory pricing and it is incorrect to view the discount offered on 
the first good as an opportunity cost. This point applies especially to loyalty programs 
that are designed for a specific consumer. In such cases, the consumer typically satisfies 
the loyalty requirement and receives the “discount,” so no one pays the undiscounted 
“list” price. Recognizing this, the firm does not necessarily set the undiscounted price 
with the goal of selling any units at that price. Hence the discount should not be 
considered an opportunity cost. 
  Second, even when some sales occur at the list price, that price may not prevail 
absent the nonlinear pricing strategy. The reason again is that the firm may be using 
                                                 
35 The compensatory price test terminology is due to Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An Economic 
Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8 (1981). 
36 When rival firms can assemble the entire the bundle themselves so that there is bundle-to-bundle 
competition (i.e. there is no monopoly good), the analysis of pricing is simplified to the standard predatory 
pricing approach where one treats the entire bundle as a single product.  
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bundling to price discriminate. Indeed, having the same list price absent the nonlinear 
pricing strategy would be unlikely.
37 If a different price would prevail, it is wrong to treat 
the discount D as the relevant opportunity cost. In fact, given that D is not necessarily the 
appropriate opportunity cost, a firm could flunk the AMC test yet not harm competition. 
For example, suppose that there are two consumers. One consumer is willing to pay $15 
for A but places no value on B, while the second consumer values A at $11 and B at $6. 
Suppose B is sold competitively for $5, the constant marginal cost of producing B. The 
monopolist of A will charge $11 for A when he sells only A, will sell 2 units, and will 
earn $22 where, for simplicity, we assume that there are no costs to producing A. With 
(mixed) bundling, the monopolist of A will charge $15 for A alone and $16 for the bundle 
(A, B), and earn $26 (= $15 + $16 - $5).
38 Notice how the stand-alone price for A rises 
from $11 to $15 when the monopolist of A uses mixed bundling. This pricing fails the 
first prong of the AMC test because the discount is $15 + $5 - $16 = $4 and the marginal 
cost for B is $5, yielding a net cost of $9 which exceeds the price of B ($5). Each 
consumer will buy from the monopolist and no firm that sells only B will exist. Yet there 
is no competitive harm to consumers of B since they continue to benefit from the 
competitive constraint on the price of B of $5 imposed by potential producers of B.
39 (The 
                                                 
37 PATRICK GREENLEE & DAVID REITMAN, COMPETING WITH LOYALTY DISCOUNTS (U.S. Dep’t of Justice 
EAG Discussion Paper 04-02, revised, available at 
http://www.wcas.northwestern.edu/csio/Conferences/Papers2006/GreenleeandReitmanpaper.pdf, 2006) 
present a differentiated single product duopoly model in which duopolists offer competing loyalty 
discounts, and find equilibrium results that are in the spirit of prong (1). That is, if a firm increases its 
loyalty program in a manner in which incremental cost exceeds incremental revenue, then the firm must 
have some goal other than short term profit maximization. Consistent with our discussion here, in their 
model there is a consumer segment that is only offered the list price (so some sales are made at the list 
price), and there is neither a monopoly nor a motive for price discrimination. For additional discussion, 
including how their analysis relates to Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC [257 F.3d 256 
(3
rd Cir. 2001); Case No. IV/D-2/34.780, Virgin/British Airways (1999)], consult Kobayashi supra note 2 
and Greenlee & Reitman supra note 2. 
38 At $16, the consumer purchases the bundle and enjoys $1 of surplus. A bundle priced at $17 generates 
zero consumer surplus, so the consumer would instead purchase just B for $5 and enjoy $1 of surplus. 
39 If customers purchase the goods in fixed proportions and there are constant returns to scale and perfect 
competition for B, any bundled pricing that induces consumers to take the bundle rather than purchase  
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consumer who values A at $15 is worse off as a result of the bundling, but not because 
rival B producers have been eliminated.) Indeed, suppose that there are many consumers 
who value B alone at $5 and place no value on A. They would continue to be served by 
producers solely of B. No exclusion of rivals occurs, yet the AMC safe harbor test is 
failed.
40 
  Third, a firm does not sacrifice profits today for increased future profit when it 
uses a loyalty discount to price discriminate. Rather, the firm is doing a better job of 
extracting rents today. Thus there are no losses to recoup, or the losses are recouped 
instantaneously on another product. The presence of calculated “losses” is due entirely to 
the accounting convention of the analyst, namely attributing a discount offered on the 
monopoly product as a cost of the competitive product. For these, the recoupment 
requirement (prong (2)) either makes no sense or is vacuous.
41 
  Fourth, if the goal of a bundled loyalty discount actually is predation on product 
B, why “fund” the below-cost pricing with discounts given on another product? Why not 
just engage in predation on B? One motive may be that the firm employs a bundled 
loyalty discount in order to disguise predation. Alternatively, the loyalty program may be 
a less costly form of predation because the firm does a better job of extracting rents from 
its monopoly while it is preying in the competitive market. This latter explanation, 
                                                                                                                                                 
products separately will fail the first prong of the AMC test. Of course, the second prong could never be 
satisfied under these conditions (i.e., the firm could not recoup such losses). This suggests that the first 
prong is likely to condemn lots of behavior even when that behavior creates no antitrust harm. 
40 For additional discussion of how bundled discounts can be used by a firm to improve rent extraction, and 
how such firms can pass or fail the AMC test without necessarily harming competition, consult Patrick 
Greenlee, David Reitman & David S. Sibley, An Antitrust Analysis of Bundled Loyalty Discounts, 26 INT’L 
J. INDUS. ORG. (forthcoming, 2008). The fact that the discount calculated in the AMC test often is not the 
appropriate opportunity cost suggests that the AMC test may in some settings make the reverse mistake. 
Namely, a firm may use a bundle discount to exclude rival B producers (by denying them necessary scale) 
in which the standalone price for A is not much higher than the program price for A. In such cases, the 
calculated discount for A is not large, so that the marginal cost of B plus the allocated discount may not 
exceed the price of B (which itself may be inflated due to reduced competition). 
41 DENNIS W. CARLTON & MICHAEL WALDMAN, SAFE HARBORS FOR QUANTITY DISCOUNTS AND 
BUNDLING (U.S. Dep’t of Justice EAG Discussion Paper 08-1, 2008), Greenlee, Reitman & Sibley, supra 
note 40, Nalebuff supra note 2, and the PeaceHealth opinion also make this point.  
 
23
however, is problematic in that we would expect to see a similar loyalty program offered 
by the firm even if it had no desire to prey in the second market. The motive would be 
better rent extraction in its current monopoly.
42 
  Fifth, on prong (3), the primary question is what does it mean to establish that 
“the bundled discount or rebate program has had or is likely to have an adverse effect on 
competition.”? One possibility is that this language is part of the AMC recommendation 
in order to make the price/cost test prong a safe harbor. Namely, it does not suffice to 
prove that the defendant firm priced below cost as calculated according to prong (1) and 
that “recoupment” is likely, according to prong (2). The AMC approach requires a 
plaintiff to show that competition has been reduced. PeaceHealth points out that this 
requirement is tantamount to a full blown analysis of the case and, as such, does little to 
shorten the analysis. 
IV. OUR APPROACH 
  Rather than focusing on a price/cost test to establish that a defendant has engaged 
in predatory or anticompetitive conduct involving multiple products, our approach turns 
the emphasis to competitive effects. We move from a price/cost test whose logic is not 
always well-grounded to establishing the elements required in the economic theories of 
anticompetitive harm described in Section III.
43 Recognizing that there frequently are 
                                                 
42 One scenario in which funding predation in this manner would be better than a single product pricing 
strategy is if courts adopted a total cost predation standard for multiproduct bundles. That is, suppose it 
were legal to offer any pricing schedule for which the total outlay charged for a collection of goods always 
exceed the cost to produce that collection of goods. 3M advocated this legal approach in LePage’s as did 
PeaceHealth in PeaceHealth. See also Timothy J. Muris, Comments on Antitrust Law, Economics, and 
Bundled Discounts, Submitted on Behalf of the United States Telecom Association (available at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/public_studies_fr28902/exclusionary_conduct.htm, July 15, 2005). 
Under such a regime, a firm with a monopoly (or more accurately, a product that earned a high margin) 
could price another good below cost whenever it was part of a bundle that included the monopoly product. 
The firm would pass such a screen, yet could (attempt to) prey upon single product rivals. 
43 One might ask whether there are better price costs tests than the AMC’s to identify pricing that is so 
peculiar (is not consistent with profit maximization absent predation) as to merit antitrust scrutiny. 
Unfortunately the answer is no. In a multiproduct setting, there do not appear to be simple pricing rules 
governing the pricing across products. See, e.g., David Sibley & Padmenabham Srinagesh, Multiproduct 
Nonlinear Pricing with Multiple Taste Characteristics, 28 RAND J. ECON. 684 (1977) who show that the  
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pro-competitive rationales for non-linear pricing, we also permit defendant firms to make 
efficiency arguments for their pricing strategies. 
In what follows, we adopt the terminology associated with tying. Namely, if a 
pricing strategy generates discounts on product(s) A provided the consumer purchases 
enough of product(s) B, we refer to A as a “tying good” and B as the “competitive good” 
or “tied good.” We use these terms as shorthand, and do not mean to imply that the 
approach below applies only to cases that meet legal definitions of tying. 
Required Elements 
1. There are economies of scale in the rival firm’s production of the competitive (or tied) 
good, and the plaintiff could otherwise compete against the defendant. 
Plaintiff firms may be excluded from a market due to competition on the merits, 
or due to anticompetitive strategies engaged in by rivals. A firm with high costs (and 
hence high prices) or low quality products should not be rescued by the courts when it 
gets excluded in the marketplace due to competition. For a pricing strategy to have an 
anticompetitive effect on rival firms, the strategy must alter the ability of rival firms to 
compete. This can be accomplished by denying a rival firm sales which otherwise would 
insure its survival or reduce its marginal costs. 
Example 1. The rival firm has constant returns to scale technology—each unit 
costs the firm c to produce. If the pricing strategy employed by the dominant firm does 
not increase c, then there can be no anticompetitive effect. In equilibrium, the pricing 
strategy may divert sales away from the rival firm, but the competitive constraint offered 
by the single product firm remains. In fact, the rival firm could lose all of its current 
customers (complete “exclusion”), but as long as there are no fixed costs, the possibility 
of purchasing from the rival firm (whose marginal cost is still c) maintains the current 
level of competition. 
Example 2. The rival firm has constant marginal cost c and a positive fixed cost 
F. If the prevailing equilibrium price for the competitive good is p, then the rival firm is 
excluded only if cannot sell at least  ) /( c p F −  units. If it cannot sell at least this amount 
when facing the nonlinear pricing strategy of the dominant firm, then the rival firm will 
                                                                                                                                                 
multi-product price schedule optimal for price discrimination may include goods for which incremental 
cost exceeds incremental revenue.  
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exit. Thus, if F is large, or the margin  c p −  is small, the rival firm will need a large 
quantity of sales to participate in the market. 
The presence of scale economies by itself is not enough to establish the possibility 
of competitive harm. If a firm can otherwise attain the necessary scale level, then a 
nonlinear pricing strategy that shifts some sales to the defendant firm will not induce 
exclusion, and there therefore should not be an antitrust violation. For there to be an 
anticompetitive effect, it must be the case that the plaintiff firm would have provided a 
more potent competitive constraint had the defendant firm not employed its nonlinear 
pricing strategy. As in the case of single product pricing, it may be difficult to determine 
what pricing strategy the defendant firm would otherwise employ. While recognizing that 
marginal cost pricing may not be the equilibrium strategy employed by the defendant 
(because products may be differentiated, for example), we recommend assuming that the 
plaintiff otherwise would compete against the defendant’s product(s) priced at marginal 
cost. If the plaintiff can show that it could compete against such pricing, and that the 
defendant firm’s pricing scheme denies it scale necessary to remain active in the market, 
then the plaintiff has satisfied this required element. 
2. The defendant firm has market power in the tying good 
  When a firm uses linked pricing to exclude rival firms and reduce competition, it 
demonstrates that it possesses market power. Absent such market power, rival firms can 
continue to make acceptable offers to consumers and remain in the market, so 
competition would not be reduced in such cases. The questions then are whether 
establishing market power should be a requirement for proving an antitrust violation, and 
whether the defendant must already have market power prior to using linked pricing to 
exclude rival firms. When there are scale economies and firms can make customer-
specific offers (i.e. price discriminate), a firm lacking ex ante market power can exclude 
by taking advantage of a lack of coordination among buyers.
44 Given this possibility, we 
                                                 
44 The details depend on how offers are made to consumers (public or private, sequential or simultaneous, 
etc), and whether buyers are final consumers. See Eric Rasmussen, J. Mark Ramseyer & John S.Wiley, 
Naked Exclusion, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 1137 (1991), Ilya Segal & Michael D. Whinston, Naked Exclusion: 
Comment, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 296 (2000), Chiara Fumagalli & Massimo Motta, Exclusive Dealing and 
Entry, When Buyers Compete, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 785 (2006), John Simpson & Abraham L. Wickelgren,  
 
26
do not require a showing of ex ante market power. We are, however, concerned about 
incorrectly condemning behavior that turns out to be aggressive price competition. To 
accommodate this tradeoff, we propose requiring a plaintiff to establish ex ante market 
power if the case is brought before rival firms have exited. In such instances, there is a 
heightened danger of false positives—namely convicting firms that compete aggressively 
but do not exclude rivals. If they have exited, a plaintiff need only demonstrate that the 
defendant has ex post market power (i.e. after the defendant has employed its linked 
pricing strategy). 
 3. Does the price of the tied good increase for consumers that do not buy the tying good? 
  As discussed above, a non-linear multiproduct price schedule may be designed to 
extract rents in a monopoly product. In such cases, markups in a competitive product may 
serve the role of a flat fee or metering device for a monopoly product. If there are 
consumers that purchase only the tied product, it is natural to focus on the prices paid by 
such consumers because price discrimination or monopoly rent extraction is not a motive 
for such sales. If the price paid by such customers does not change following the 
introduction of a non-linear pricing scheme, then competition for the tied product has not 
been damaged. Consumers that purchase both goods may pay more, but this may reflect 
that the monopolist is doing a better job of extracting the available monopoly rents. If 
there are customers that purchase only the tied good, then a requirement for a case against 
a monopolist’s use of a nonlinear pricing scheme is that the price paid for the competitive 
good by such customers increases, or is likely to increase.
45 
4. Is the rival firm still in the market? Has its marginal cost increased? 
  If no rival firms exit, and their marginal costs have not increased, then such firms 
continue to provide the same level of competitive constraint in the marketplace. While a 
multiproduct pricing scheme may reduce the sales made by rival firms and hence raise 
                                                                                                                                                 
Naked Exclusion, Efficient Breach, and Downstream Competition, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1305 (2007), and 
the discussion in MICHAEL D. WHINSTON, LECTURES ON ANTITRUST ECONOMICS (2008). 
45 The focus here on the standalone price for B differs from the approach presented in Greenlee, Reitman & 
Sibley supra note 40. They recommend focusing on the a la carte and loyalty program prices for A, and 
show that increases in the a la carte price are associated with consumer surplus reductions. In their base 
model, however, the B market is perfectly competitive so there cannot be a competitive effect for 
consumers that purchase only B.   
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rival firms’ average cost, rival firms that remain in business with the same marginal cost 
can continue to provide the same offers to consumers. Since in such cases the dominant 
firm continues to face the same competition, a multiproduct pricing strategy that does not 
drive a rival firm completely out of business cannot harm the competitive process. 
Competition can be harmed without inducing complete exit, however, provided that 
denying scale causes a rival firm’s marginal cost to increase. In such cases, the rival firm 
cannot profitably make the same low price offers to consumers, and the dominant firm 
may respond by raising price. One manner in which marginal cost could increase is if the 
pricing strategy denies access to the most efficient method of distribution. Another 
possibility is that in a dynamic setting the reduction in volume reduces the incentive for 
R&D which, in turn, raises the firm’s marginal cost in subsequent periods.
46 
With this, it follows that key questions for assessing potential anticompetitive 
effects of a linked pricing strategy are whether or not rival firms remain in business, and 
if they do, have their marginal costs increased? If rival firms remain in business and their 
marginal costs have not risen, then competition has not been harmed and there should be 
no antitrust violation. If rival firms remain in business, establishing an antitrust violation 
should require the plaintiff to demonstrate that as a result of the dominant firm’s pricing 
strategy, they have lost sales that have caused their marginal costs to increase 
significantly. If firms have exited, or are on the brink of exit, they should demonstrate 
that the linked pricing schedule has caused them to lose scale necessary to remain in 
business. 
Potential Offsetting Efficiencies 
Our discussion in Section II described some rationales for linked pricing 
schedules other than excluding rival firms that cannot offer the same collection of goods. 
These included reducing costs by achieving economies of scale and price discrimination. 
Just as efficiencies can counteract the harmful effects of a merger and should be 
included as a potential merger defense, efficiencies may affect competitive harms caused 
                                                 
46 In most cases the answers to our third and fourth required elements will go in the same direction. In some 
cases, like the PeaceHealth case discussed in the next section, there will be no information for one of these 
two elements. When these two elements give contradictory answers, one will have to further investigate the 
causes of the price changes and/or exit, and the consequences of permitting the pricing strategy.  
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by a nonlinear pricing strategy that disadvantages or excludes rival firms. As in merger 
review, the efficiencies should count only if they are not otherwise attainable, and the 
benefits from improved efficiency should be balanced against the competitive harms. Our 
approach differs from the “no economic sense” test which asks only if there is some 
benefit to the firm from the pricing strategy that is not related to excluding rival firms. 
Under that approach, a plaintiff would have to establish that but for the exclusionary 
effect, the challenged practice made “no economic sense.” Thus, the existence of benefits 
would be enough for the defendant to prevail. In contrast, our approach, as in mergers, 
requires one to show that the benefits are not otherwise achievable, and that they 
outweigh the competitive harms.
47 
The rationales discussed in Section II also included price discrimination. While 
price discrimination can increase total surplus, its effects on total surplus are in general 
ambiguous. If in the course of price discriminating, a firm causes rival firms to exit an 
otherwise competitive market (B), then in most cases this exclusion will allow the price 
discriminating firm to increase its price for B (while it continues to price discriminate). 
Such a price increase is a competitive harm. Given this possibility, we recommend not 
recognizing price discrimination as a defense. If a price discriminating defendant can 
establish that exit by rival firms does not allow it to raise the price for B, then the B 
market has not been adversely affected. 
V. DISCUSSION 
  In this section we illustrate how our approach could be applied to LePage’s and to 
PeaceHealth. We do not discuss in detail the factual record in either litigation, and 
instead focus on key questions that would have to be answered in order to determine 
whether a nonlinear multiproduct pricing schedule reduced competition.
48 
                                                 
47 For the “no economic sense” test, see Gregory J. Werden, Identifying Exclusionary Conduct Under 
Section 2: the ‘No Economic Sense’ Test, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 413 (2006). Timothy J. Brennan, Bundled 
Rebates as Exclusion, not Predation (unpublished manuscript, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=992907, 2007) argues how the lack of balancing in the 
no economic sense test coupled with the frequent existence of some benefits (however small) leads one to 
conclude that nearly all unilateral behavior would be per se legal under that test. 
48 This discussion of LePage’s relies heavily on Rubinfeld supra note 2.  
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 In  LePage’s, the plaintiff claimed that it lost large customers due to 3M’s loyalty 
rebates, and as a result lost the benefit of economies of scale. LePage’s, however, 
provided no testimony about such scale economies in the production or distribution of 
invisible tape. Furthermore, LePage’s provided no quantitative evidence about prices or 
costs, and did not claim that 3M had priced invisible tape, or some incremental volume of 
tape, below cost (even when discounts on other products were allocated to tape
49). 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, LePage’s assets did not vanish from the market—
they were purchased in May 2000 by Conros, a Toronto-based conglomerate. As part of 
Conros, LePage’s continues to develop new tape products
50 and according to a December 
2007 press release: 
Today, through its extensive distribution network, LePage’s provides branded 
and private label products to a number of large US retailers, including Office 
Depot, Wal-Mart, Kroger/Fred Meyer, HEB, Walgreen’s, Rite Aid, Publix, 
Wegman’s and Food Lion, amongst several others.
51 
 
In terms of our approach, LePage’s failed to provide evidence to support our first and 
third required elements--scale economies and observed/predicted price effects.
52 At trial, 
3M, with its Scotch tape brand and large market share, was shown to have market power 
in transparent tape, so the second required element would have been satisfied. While 
LePage’s claim would have failed under our approach due to a lack of evidence 
establishing (i) the importance of scale economies and (ii) observed/predicted price 
                                                 
49 Thus LePage’s did not perform the price/cost test introduced in Ortho and advocated by the AMC. 
50 See, for example, Christina Campbell, Tale of the Tape: North America Competition, CANADIAN BUS. 
April 24, 2006, available at 
http://www.canadianbusiness.com/managing/strategy/article.jsp?content=20060424_76378_76378 
(describes new LePage’s tape dispensers with palm guards and a brake system). 
51 Press Release, Pure Energy Visions Corporation, Pure Energy signs United States National Distribution 
Agreement with Conros Corporation, parent of LePage’s (December 24, 2007), available at 
http://www.usetdas.com/TDAS/NewsArticle.aspx?NewsID=10329 
52 With respect to price effects, Rubinfeld supra note 2 notes that it was undisputed that total output of 
transparent tape increased over the relevant time period. In addition, the public record does not include any 
information about how 3M’s tape prices changed over time. With respect to scale economies, 3M argued 
that LePage’s had been able to compete in the marketplace for a long time at a relatively small scale.  
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increases, perhaps the most important shortcoming for its claim is that LePage’s would 
have failed our fourth required element. LePage’s remains in business and has many large 
U.S. retailer customers. Given this fact, LePage’s would have had to demonstrate that its 
marginal cost had increased as a result of 3M’s pricing strategy. LePage’s did not 
establish this. Ultimately, 3M’s discount pricing strategy may have caused LePage’s to 
lose some large customers, but based on the available evidence the bundled rebates did 
not exclude LePage’s or raise its marginal cost, and hence competition was not harmed. 
 In  PeaceHealth, the parties were the only providers of hospital care in Lane 
County, Oregon. Both parties offered primary and secondary hospital care, while only 
PeaceHealth offered tertiary hospital care. The subject of this litigation was discounts that 
PeaceHealth offered to insurance companies that purchased exclusively from 
PeaceHealth. That is, PeaceHealth charged lower reimbursement rates (prices) for 
primary, secondary, and tertiary care to customers that did not use plaintiff McKenzie-
Williamette Hospital (“McKenzie”). McKenzie’s claims against PeaceHealth included 
attempted monopolization, tying, and exclusive dealing.  
  PeaceHealth is noteworthy in that the court invited amicus briefs on the issue of 
whether a plaintiff in a bundled discount attempted monopolization case had to prove that 
the defendant’s prices were below its costs. The opinion discusses several incremental 
price/cost tests, and ultimately finds that a plaintiff must establish prong (1) of the AMC 
test in order to prove that a defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive 
conduct. Like us, the court finds that prong (2) of the AMC test (recoupment) makes no 
sense when the pricing strategy involves multiple products. Finally, the court finds prong 
(3) redundant—it is no different than the general requirement of a plaintiff to establish 
antitrust injury. Thus, the opinion focuses largely on the allocated discount price/cost test 
advocated by the AMC. 
  In terms of applying our required elements to PeaceHealth, there are scale 
economies in offering hospital care due, in part, to the medical equipment required to run 
a hospital. For purposes of assessing PeaceHealth’s ability to exclude McKenzie, a key 
issue is how many customers (or insured lives) does a hospital like McKenzie need to 
cover its fixed costs. If just a small number of insurance company customers can cover 
these costs, then it would be difficult for PeaceHealth to drive McKenzie out of business  
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by denying them scale. Prior to the bundling strategy, McKenzie argues that its prices 
were lower than PeaceHealth’s, suggesting that McKenzie was providing some 
competitive discipline. Whether or not our first required element is established would 
depend on how significant these scale economies are. 
  A related point can be found in the PeaceHealth jury instruction about bundled 
discounts (based on LePage’s): 
Bundled price discounts may be anti-competitive if they are offered by a 
monopolist and substantially foreclose portions of the market to a 
competitor who does not provide an equally diverse group of services and 
who therefore cannot make a comparable offer.
53 
As we have discussed above, such discounts can harm competition only if they deny 
important scale to a rival firm. Thus, this instruction is consistent with our approach only 
if “substantially foreclose” is interpreted to mean something like “deny enough of the 
market to drive the competitor out of business or raise its marginal cost.” It is not enough 
to show that the rival firm was “foreclosed” from some customers, or that it was 
foreclosed from a substantial share of them. The key to establishing competitive harm is 
showing that the foreclosed business left insufficient scale for the firm to remain in 
business (or the denied scale led to increased marginal cost). How “substantial” such 
foreclosure must be will depend on the scale economies for the competitive product(s).  
  For our second required element, PeaceHealth performed 90% of the tertiary 
neonatal services and 93% of the tertiary cardiovascular services in Lane County. Due to 
these high market shares, the fact that no other provider in Lane County offers tertiary 
services, as well as the presence of non-trivial entry barriers, it is reasonable to conclude 
that PeaceHealth has market power in the provision of tertiary hospital services in Lane 
County, so the second required element is satisfied. 
  The competition between PeaceHealth and McKenzie is for the 28 health 
insurance companies that operate in Lane County. If any of them purchase only primary 
and secondary hospital services, our approach would ask whether such customers pay 
                                                 
53 PeaceHealth, at 11213. PeaceHealth argued that this instruction incorrectly states the law because any 
bundle discount that involves a monopoly product will meet this definition, without considering whether 
the defendant priced below cost, or whether the plaintiff was an equally efficient competitor.  
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higher prices. Given that it is unlikely that any of these customers purchase only primary 
and secondary services, our third element is neither established nor contradicted. 
  Our fourth element checks to see if McKenzie has exited the market or if its 
marginal cost has increased due to reduced sales. McKenzie had suffered financial losses 
in the time period leading up to and including the litigation, but it did not exit. In fact, it 
merged with Triad Hospitals in 2003 and opened a new cardiac surgery suite and 
recovery unit in 2007.
54 For hospital services, it is unlikely that the cost of serving an 
additional patient (marginal cost) varies greatly for patient levels up to a hospital’s bed 
capacity, so denying customers to McKenzie while not inducing McKenzie’s exit 
probably had no effect on McKenzie’s ability to compete for new contracts.
55 While it 
may have suffered losses over a period of time, McKenzie did not exit, and its marginal 
costs likely did not increase.
56 If this is correct, then McKenzie would fail to establish our 
fourth required element. 
  There is no mention of any efficiency or price discrimination rationales for 
PeaceHealth’s bundled discounts. 
  In sum, based on our reading of the opinions as well as some market facts 
(namely the continued existence of McKenzie-Williamette Hospital and LePage’s tape 
facility as part of Conros), our approach would suggest that neither 3M nor PeaceHealth 
engaged in exclusionary conduct when they offered bundled discounts. 
                                                 
54 Cardiac surgery is a tertiary service. Recruiting professionals to operate the facility took longer than 
expected. The first open heart surgery there (in March 2007) was performed by two surgeons whose 
practice is owned by PeaceHealth. See Tim Christie, Cardiac Surgery a Reality in Springfield, REGISTER-
GUARD, March 8, 2007, at B1. 
55 McKenzie in theory could have responded to lower revenues by selling some of its medical equipment in 
order to reduce its fixed costs. This could diminish McKenzie’s ability to compete by reducing the quality 
of its offered services. We are not aware of any such cost cutting measures at McKenzie. 
56 It is unclear whether PeaceHealth abandoned the bundle discount while litigation was underway. 
Presumably, McKenzie could prevail on this required element only if it could be established that 
PeaceHealth had indeed stopped using a bundle discount, and that McKenzie would have exited had 




There has been much confusion over the proper approach to analyzing antitrust 
claims involving single product quantity discounts and multi-product nonlinear pricing 
schedules that may include ties or bundle discounts. Part of the confusion arises from a 
failure to distinguish price discrimination from pricing that harms competition by 
weakening the competitive constraint that rivals provide. 
 As a general matter, we find it useful to have a price cost test as a safe harbor for 
antitrust claims based on non-linear pricing of either single or multiple products. In 
constructing a safe harbor for single product cases, we can use the observation that it is 
unusual for incremental cost to exceed incremental price, though even this test is not 
perfect. In the case of multiple products, it is more difficult to construct a simple price 
cost test that does not have serious drawbacks. When there is bundle-to-bundle 
competition, testing to see whether the bundle’s price exceeds cost is a reasonable 
possibility. When there is not bundle-to-bundle competition, the discount allocation rule 
proposed by the AMC has the drawback that it may fail to exonerate price discrimination 
that creates no competitive harm. Our view is that any price cost test will let through 
some conduct that can create antitrust harm and will similarly fail to exonerate some 
conduct that creates no such harm. We are willing to tolerate such mistakes because we 
think that offering discounts is generally pro-competitive. The fact that such price cost 
tests will fail to identify some anticompetitive behavior is the price one must pay for 
creating a business environment that does not chill price competition. Failing a safe 
harbor price cost test like the AMC test, however, should not cause one to condemn a 
pricing practice because our analysis shows that behavior that is not anticompetitive can 
easily flunk such tests. Using the economic theory of harm that underlies most models of 
anticompetitive exclusionary behavior, we propose an alternative set of tests as a safe 
harbor. For those who disagree with our view that price cost safe harbors, however 
imperfect, are desirable in this setting, we suggest they use our safe harbors only, while 
for those who agree with our views on the usefulness of price cost tests, we suggest using 
our tests as another set of safe harbors. 
Our analysis has shown that an approach like the AMC’s which tries to apply the 
theory underlying single product predation to settings with multiple products has several  
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drawbacks. The approach we advocate here, either in addition to, or instead of, the 
discount allocation test, is to focus on competitive effects. A key ingredient in almost all 
anticompetitive theories that survive the one monopoly rent critique is the presence of 
scale economies. Our approach requires a plaintiff to establish that there are significant 
scale economies and that the challenged pricing scheme denies necessary scale to rival 
firms. If scale economies can still be achieved by the rival firms, then competition is not 
impaired and there should be no antitrust violation. Our second requirement is the 
presence of market power by the defendant. Our third requirement focuses on 
competitive effects and requires that prices have increased for customers that have no 
interest in the monopoly product. Finally we require that the competitive constraints 
provided by rivals have been significantly weakened either because the rivals have 
actually exited, are likely to do so in the near future, or because the rivals’ marginal costs 
have risen. Unless all four requirements are met, there should be no antitrust liability. 
Since bundling and quantity discounts are ubiquitous even in the absence of 
significant market power, we know that there are underlying procompetitive justifications 
for them. Accordingly, one should be wary of over-zealous pursuit of antitrust liability 
for fear of chilling competition. 
 